Wireless sensors, which are smaller and cheaper, have started being used in many different applications.
protocol, the protocol packets carrying routing information are protected, which facilitates establishing secure routes between source and destination nodes. • The signature in the request and reply packets facilitates the identification of malicious nodes in the network and helps discard their fraudulent messages.
• The proposed security mechanism is light-weight and adds little overhead to the communication delay.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, security and privacy issues related to WSNs are presented. In Section 3, the proposed security mechanism is introduced for facilitating secure routing in WSNs. In Section 4, the node placement scenario used in the performance evaluations is presented. In Section 5, the comparative performance evaluations are presented for both the proposed secure routing protocol and the original AODV routing protocol for WSNs. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
Related work
In this section, a literature review about existing security problems in WSN applications is presented, which include SCADA systems, body sensors, industrial automation and control systems, underwater systems, etc. Furthermore, existing solutions are given.
Although WSNs are popular in both civilian and military sectors, they have their limitations, such as battery life, computation power, and memory, when it comes to implementing traditional security mechanisms on WSN nodes [7, 8] . In [7] , the authors gave the WSN protocol stack and existing attacks on WSNs. They also gave information about the basic security requirements including authentication, light-weight private key infrastructure, and symmetric key algorithms. They also mentioned secure routing in WSNs.
In [9] , the existing attacks on WSNs for SCADA systems were presented and classified. Key management methods were summarized for achieving secure data transmission. In [10] , the security issues in body sensor networks (BSN) were discussed. A key agreement protocol was proposed for BSNs and its performance analysis was given in terms of memory, computation cost, communication cost, and energy consumption. It was concluded that, due to the limitations of BSNs such as small storage area and restricted computation power, symmetric key encryption is more preferable than asymmetric key encryption for providing security to BSNs.
In [11] , the authors reviewed the reliability and security issues of WSNs in industrial automation and control systems. They claimed that, after the energy consumption problem, security is the most important problem for WSNs in industrial applications. They mentioned cryptographic methods used in WSNs and suggested that traditional public key encryption algorithms are complex and not suitable for WSNs. They suggested that relatively less costly symmetric key algorithms such as AES, DES, and RC4 are used in WSNs and the secret key is kept in a secure area on the sensor node.
In [12] , the authors proposed an anonymous authentication method for wireless body area networks (WBAN). Since the client and server communicate wirelessly in WBANs, there should be an authentication scheme used for authenticating this communication. Instead of using traditional authentication schemes, they suggested storing the verification data on the network manager, unlike other approaches where the verification data are stored by the application provider. Although the proposed method provides security, since it uses a bilinear pairing scheme, it is not suitable for a distributed services environment and a multiserver architecture should be used to guarantee secure communications.
In [13] , the authors discussed security and privacy issues for underwater sensor networks. They summarized some attacks on underwater sensor networks and countermeasures to overcome them. Furthermore, they proposed mechanisms to achieve security and preserve node privacy in such networks.
In [14] , the authors investigated attacks on WSNs. They reviewed the protocol stack of WSNs, summarized possible attacks at different protocol stacks, and gave the consequences of the attacks on network performance. They implemented some of these attacks using Cooja, the Contiki's network simulator/emulator, to show their efficacy.
In [15] , the authors proposed a mechanism to detect blackhole nodes in the network. They added a validity value in reply packets to detect blackhole nodes. Although the simulation results were good, an intelligent blackhole attack may bypass the proposed mechanism by resetting the validity value in the same way it is initially added.
In [16] , the authors proposed deploying the base node (BN) in the network to detect malicious nodes.
According to the proposed scheme, the BN broadcasts dummy route request packets periodically and waits for replies. As the nonmalicious nodes do not send a reply packet, the BN can list all the nodes sending a reply packet as malicious nodes. Finally, the BN shares its list of malicious nodes with the normal nodes, so that normal nodes can block the malicious nodes. This mechanism can prevent the blackhole attack and increase the delivery ratio. However, the BN is the single point of failure here and, in the case of the failure of the BN, the proposed blackhole attack prevention mechanism will not work.
In [17] , the authors proposed a mechanism to protect the network against blackhole and wormhole attacks. They also tried to improve network stability. They used a counter for checking the correct AODV routing behavior. In order to monitor the system, they counted the transmitted reply messages. Although the packet delivery ratio increases in the proposed mechanism, the average end-to-end delay also increases.
In [18] , the authors proposed a reliable and secure data transmission mechanism to mitigate blackhole attacks in metropolitan area networks (MANETs). MANETs use the AOMDV routing protocol, which is a modification of the AODV protocol. The main idea of the proposed mechanism is to split transmitted messages into many parts. All parts of the split message are encrypted using an enhanced homomorphic encryption scheme. On the receiver side, all received message parts are decrypted. Although the delivery ratio increases in the proposed mechanism, since one message is split into many parts, the total end-to-end delay increases. Moreover, the energy usage may increase because of the increased total size of the transmitted messages.
In [19] , the authors proposed to install an intrusion detection system (IDS) for every node in the network.
Every node in the network has a unique ID and the IDS monitors the traffic in the network. When a malicious node is detected, it is forwarded to the base station. In this mechanism, the base station is the single point of failure and, if the base station breaks down, the system will fail in detecting malicious nodes. Furthermore, having an IDS run every WSN node adds a significant computational burden.
In [20] , the authors made improvements on the AODV routing protocol to detect blackhole attacks. They proposed adding all incoming route reply packets in a table in the source node. This table stores the information contained in the received RREP packets. Also, a threshold value was defined to compare the destination sequence number. When a node receives a RREP packet, it compares the sequence number of the RREP packet with the threshold value and decides whether the node that sent the RREP packet is malicious. The proposed method increases the delivery ratio and throughput. However, it does not propose a solution for the RREQ packets and may not work if there is single adjacent node to the source.
All the studies mentioned above show that security is one of the most vital problems facing WSNs. Hence, there is an urgent need for investigating effective security mechanisms to increase the security and thus reliability of WSNs.
Although several of the studies mentioned above have made important and valuable contributions for blackhole attack prevention in WSNs, there is a single point of failure in most of these proposed solutions. Furthermore, many of the proposed existing solutions do not take advantage of an encryption algorithm. Finally, existing studies focus on only the reply packets in the AODV protocol. With this study, a solution is proposed that mitigates blackhole attacks by focusing on both the request and reply packets in the AODV protocol. The proposed solution uses encryption and it does not have a single point of failure.
Proposed secure routing protocol
In the WSN protocol stack, there are five layers and each layer has a different responsibility [14, 21] . The protocol stack and possible attacks at each layer are given in Table 1 and summarized as follows:
• Data aggregation and interactions with the end user are performed at the application layer. The clone attack [22] is a possible attack applied at this layer.
• Reliable data transfer is performed at the transport layer. The data integrity attack [23] , energy drain attack, and flooding attack [24] are possible attacks at this layer.
• Routing for data communication is performed at the network layer. The blackhole attack [15-17, 25, 26] , replay attack [27] , selective forwarding attack, grayhole attack [28] , wormhole attack [29] , and hello flood attack [30] are performed at this layer.
• Medium access and error control for transmitted data are performed at the data link layer. The intelligent jamming attack [31] and collision attack [32] are possible attacks at this layer.
• Modulation and frequency/channel selection are performed at the physical layer. The eavesdropping attack [33] and node tampering attack [34] are possible attacks at this layer. Eavesdropping attack [33] , node tampering attack [34] In this study, the blackhole node attack, which is a popular network layer attack, is focused on. The blackhole node attack aims at misleading source nodes. In this attack, a malicious node in the network, named the blackhole node, claims that it has the shortest path to the destination node. Thus, all data packets are directed to the malicious node to be forwarded by it to the destination node. However, when the malicious node receives a data packet, it just drops it without transmitting it to the destination node [15-20, 25, 26 ]. An illustration of the blackhole node attack against the AODV routing protocol, a popular routing protocol for WSNs, is shown in Figure 1 . In the existing AODV routing protocol, when a source node wants to transmit data to a destination node, it first broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors to discover the route. Then the intermediate nodes (neighbor nodes) check their route tables to see whether they have a route to the destination. If an intermediate node has a route to the destination, it immediately sends back a route reply (RREP) packet.
Otherwise, it forwards the received RREQ to its neighbors. This situation continues until the destination node receives the RREQ packet. When the destination node receives the RREQ packet, it sends back a RREP packet, which is forwarded all the way back to the source node [35] . This algorithm is the underlying mechanism of the AODV protocol.
With this paper, a new mechanism is proposed for the AODV routing protocol, which increases the security of the original AODV protocol by including a signature to the RREQ and RREP packets. The proposed protocol, called secure AODV (SAODV), mitigates the blackhole node attack. As shown in Figures 2 and 3 , the additional 64-bit or 128-bit signature value fields "Request Signature" and "Reply Signature" are included in the original RREQ and RREP packets, respectively. The signature is generated by encrypting the 32 -bit source IP address of the node using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (with 128-bit message size) or SPECK64 (with 64 -bit message size). Furthermore, in order to prevent replay attacks, the 32 -bit destination sequence number is used as the nonce value and padded to the 32 -bit source IP address before applying encryption.
It is assumed that the shared secret key that is used for encryption/decryption is stored inside the secured tamper-resilient memory of each node during the chip manufacturing process. In the proposed scheme, when the source node wants to transmit data to the destination node, it has to sign the RREQ packet before transmitting it. The 32 -bit source IP address of the node that transmits the RREQ packet, together with the 32 -bit destination sequence number, is encrypted using a symmetric key cryptographic algorithm, namely the AES or the SPECK64 algorithm. The resulting 64 -bit cipher text for SPECK64 or the 128-bit cipher text for AES is added as the RequestSignature variable in the proposed RREQ packet format. When the RREQ packet is received by an intermediate node or the destination node, the received signature is first verified before the data are processed or relayed. If the signature is verified, either the RREQ packet is broadcast or a RREP packet is sent back (if the verifying node is the destination node). Otherwise, the RREQ packet is discarded. Thus, authentication is achieved by controlling the signature on the RREQ packet. On the reply side, when the destination node receives a RREQ packet, it replies back with a RREP packet. The RREP packet in SAODV includes the encrypted form of its 32 -bit source IP address padded with the 32 -bit destination sequence number as the nonce. The nonce value is used here to prevent replay attacks. For encryption, the SPECK64 or the AES encryption algorithm is used. The resulting 64-bit cipher text for SPECK64 or 128-bit cipher text for AES is added as the ReplySignature variable in the proposed RREP packet format. When an intermediate node or the source node receives the RREP packet, it first checks the received signature. If the signature is not verified, i.e. if the packet is not coming from a legitimate address, the RREP packet is discarded. Otherwise, the other operations are performed on the packet as usual. The signature control mechanism on the reply side provides the desired authentication mechanism. Figure 4 summarizes the proposed SAODV mechanism by showing how the RREQ and RREP packets are generated and processed. Table 2 summarizes the comparison of the proposed secure routing protocol with the existing solutions.
In [15] , since the authors added only a single bit validity value in replay packets, there was no increase in the communication delay. In [16] , only malicious nodes send reply packets in response to dummy route requests.
Therefore, this solution also does not cause extra communication delay. In [17] , the authors proposed monitoring the system by counting the transmitted reply messages to start the communication between the source node and destination node, which causes extra delay. In [18] , the authors proposed sending packets to the destination by first splitting and then encrypting them. All received split message parts are first decrypted and then combined together on the destination side. The splitting and combining operation increases total end-to-end delay in the network. In [19] , the base station broadcasts the list of malicious nodes to the network. This operation does not cause extra communication delay. In [20] , the authors proposed comparing the destination sequence number with a threshold value on the route reply side. This comparison operation does not increase the communication delay. Unlike some of the existing solutions [15-17, 19, 20] , the proposed solution uses an encryption mechanism to verify the validity of routing packets. Since a light-weight symmetric key encryption algorithm is used, the additional delay due to encryption/decryption operations is negligible as also pointed out in [36] . Unlike in several of the existing solutions [16, 18, 19] , there is no single point of failure in the proposed protocol. Furthermore, the proposed protocol protects both the response and reply packets in the routing protocol while other existing solutions protect only the reply packets.
Node placement scenario
The Network Simulator-2 (ns-2) is used to evaluate the performance of the proposed secure AODV mechanism.
In the simulations, different numbers of nodes that range between 10 and 100 and constant bit rate (CBR) traffic are used. The "setdest" function of ns-2 is used, which is responsible for generating the positions of Normal × × × [17] High × ✓ × [18] High ✓ × × [19] Normal × × × [20] Normal × ✓ × nodes, their moving speeds, and their moving directions. The number of nodes, maximum sizes of the topology along the x and y axes (the topology boundary), simulation time, maximum speed of nodes, and pause time are the parameters of this function. An example usage of the setdest function is shown below:
setdest -v 1 -n 40 -p 0 -M 1 -t 100 -x 500 -y 500
According to this example, the topology boundary is defined as 500×500 with 40 nodes and the maximum speed of the nodes is 1 m/s. An illustration of the setdest function for the node placement scenario with these parameters is shown in Figure 5 . The "cbrgen.tcl" script is used to generate the traffic pattern. This script is responsible for creating cbr or tcp traffic connections between nodes. The traffic connection type, number of nodes, maximum number of connections, seed value, and interval rate between cbr packets are the parameters of this script. An example usage of the cbrgen.tcl script is shown below: ns cbrgen.tcl -type cbr -nn 40 -seed 1 -mc 25 -rate 5.0
According to this example, a cbr type traffic is created for 40 nodes and there are 25 connections between these nodes with the seed value of 1 and the interval rate of 0.2 s.
Performance results and discussion
The performance of the original AODV routing protocol is compared with the proposed secure AODV protocol in terms of average end-to-end delay and delivery ratio for different numbers of nodes. Cbr traffic is utilized. The number of nodes in the network ranges between 10 and 100 . The ratio of the number of blackhole nodes to the total number of nodes in the grid is 10% and 20% . To statistically analyze the system, different seed values (time function of ctime library in c language) are used. Therefore, for each simulation, 100 experiments are run with different seeds and the average of the measured values is presented. In each experiment, different blackhole nodes are selected and different traffic connections between nodes are established. All the parameters used in the performance evaluations are listed in Table 3 . The simulations are performed and the performance results for both the original AODV routing protocol and the proposed secure AODV routing protocol are obtained.
In the analyzed scenario in this study, only the intermediate nodes are blackhole nodes. When the source or the destination node is a blackhole node, intermediate nodes drop the received packet since the received "Request Signature" or "Reply Signature" of the packet is not verified. The performance metrics that are used in the performance evaluations are described as follows:
• Average end-to-end delay means the average time to receive all data packets at the destination side.
• Delivery ratio means the ratio of the number of successfully received packets to the total number of transmitted packets. Figure 6 shows the average end-to-end delays for the original AODV protocol and the proposed SAODV protocol with AES and SPECK64 when there are no blackhole nodes in the grid. As shown in Figure 6 , the end-to-end delay increases for both AODV and SAODV routing protocols when the number of nodes increases.
Since there are no blackhole nodes in the grid, the source nodes try to transmit their data to the destination nodes and it takes a longer time for all the data to be transmitted when the number of nodes increases. The average end-to-end delay ranges between 13.73 ms and 152.86 ms with an average of 79.36 ms for the AODV routing protocol without blackhole nodes. For the proposed SAODV routing protocol, when there are no blackhole nodes in the grid, the average end-to-end delay (including the encryption and decryption timings) for all transmissions ranges between 58.28 ms and 451.87 ms, with an average of 255.51 ms, when AES is used.
For the proposed SAODV routing protocol without blackhole nodes, the average end-to-end delay (including the encryption and decryption timings) for all transmissions changes between 29.89 ms and 168.37 ms, with an average of 99.72 ms, when SPECK64 is used. The proposed SAODV routing protocol, with SPECK64 or AES, results in slightly higher end-to-end delay values compared to the AODV routing protocol when there are no blackhole nodes in the grid. This is because of the additional processing time and increased transmission and propagation delays due to increased message size. Figure 7 shows the delivery ratios for the original AODV routing protocol and the proposed SAODV routing protocol (with AES and SPECK64) when there are no blackhole nodes in the grid. As shown in Figure 7 , for both AODV and SAODV (with AES or SPECK64), all transmitted data packets are successfully received by the destination nodes. The delivery ratio is 100% for both the AODV and the proposed SAODV routing protocols when there are no blackhole nodes in the grid. Figure 8 shows the average end-to-end delays for the original AODV protocol and the proposed SAODV protocol with AES and SPECK64 in the existence of blackhole nodes in the grid. As shown in Figure 8 , for both the AODV and SAODV routing protocols, the end-to-end delay increases when the number of nodes in the network increases. Since there exist blackhole nodes in the grid, the blackhole nodes try to mislead the source nodes to drop all transmitted packets by immediately sending them reply packets. In the case of the existence of blackhole nodes in the grid, the original AODV routing protocol has lower end-to-end delay than the proposed SAODV routing protocol. This is due to the fact that responses from blackhole nodes are transmitted to source nodes immediately (fake routes are established between source nodes and blackhole nodes) and there is no mechanism to check the validity of the received responses. The average end-to-end delay ranges between 20.56 ms and 68.98 ms, with an average of 37.55 ms, for the AODV routing protocol in the existence of blackhole nodes accounting for 10% of all the nodes in the grid. When the blackhole ratio is 20%, the average end-to-end delay ranges between 16.81 ms and 63.43 ms, with an average of 36.65 ms, for the AODV routing protocol. When the blackhole nodes ratio is 10% and AES is used, the average end-to-end delay plus encryption and decryption time for all transmissions ranges between 74.55 ms and 502.97 ms, with an average of 283.69 ms, for the proposed SAODV routing protocol in the existence of blackhole nodes. For the proposed SAODV routing protocol in the existence of blackhole nodes accounting for 20% of all the nodes in the grid, the average end-to-end delay plus encryption and decryption time for all transmissions ranges between 86.4 ms and 545.73 ms, with an average of 308.36 ms when AES is used. When the blackhole nodes ratio is 10% and the proposed SAODV routing protocol is used with SPECK64, the average end-to-end delay plus encryption and decryption time for all transmissions ranges between 43.38 ms and 190.92 ms, with an average of 111.96 ms. When the proposed SAODV routing protocol is used with SPECK64, and in the existence of blackhole nodes with 20% blackhole nodes ratio, the average end-to-end delay plus encryption and decryption time for all transmissions ranges between 52.65 ms and 205.37 ms, with an average of 121.24 ms. Since the proposed SAODV routing protocol tries to find new routing paths to eliminate the blackhole nodes and increase the delivery ratio, it has higher end-to-end delay compared to the original AODV routing protocol. Figure 9 shows the delivery ratios for the original AODV protocol and the proposed SAODV protocol with AES and SPECK64 in the existence of blackhole nodes in the grid. As shown in Figure 9 , the delivery ratio decreases to 15.48% for the AODV routing protocol when there are 10% blackhole nodes in the grid.
The delivery ratio ranges between 15.48% and 45.38% and the average delivery ratio is 22.25% for the AODV routing protocol when 10% of all nodes are blackhole nodes. When the blackhole nodes ratio is 20% , the delivery ratio decreases down to 7.66% for the AODV routing protocol. The delivery ratio ranges between 7.66% and 31.03% and the average delivery ratio is 13.5% for the AODV routing protocol. For the proposed SAODV routing protocol with AES, when the blackhole nodes ratio is 10% , the delivery ratio ranges between 98.85% and 100.00% and the average delivery ratio is 99.49%. When the blackhole nodes ratio is increased to 20%, the delivery ratio ranges between 97.53% and 100.00% and the average delivery ratio is 98.76% . When the proposed SAODV routing protocol with SPECK64 is used and the blackhole nodes ratio is 10% , the delivery ratio ranges between 98.78% and 100% and the average delivery ratio is 99.36%. When the blackhole nodes ratio is increased to 20%, the delivery ratio ranges between 97.56% and 100% and the average delivery ratio is 98.81%. The proposed SAODV routing protocol, with AES or SPECK64, has a higher delivery ratio compared to the AODV routing protocol in the case of the existence of blackhole nodes in the grid. This shows that the proposed mechanism eliminates the blackhole nodes and increases the delivery ratio by establishing new routing paths.
Conclusion
WSNs have started being used in an increasing number of applications, such as environmental sensing, military and surveillance applications, monitoring applications, smart grid applications, and vehicular communications, with the advances in wireless communication. In this paper, the problem of blackhole node attacks on WSNs is addressed by proposing a secure routing protocol. The protocol is an improved version of the commonly used AODV routing protocol for WSNs. The added mechanism to the original AODV routing protocol helps detect and discard blackhole nodes in the network. The performance of the proposed secure routing protocol is evaluated and compared against the original AODV protocol in terms of average end-to-end delay and delivery ratio. The comparative performance evaluations prove that, by detecting and discarding the blackhole nodes in the network, the proposed mechanism increases the delivery ratio without causing too much extra delay.
Possible future research directions are identified as follows:
• The scenario of using a sink node in the network, where sensor nodes connect with a data center, may be investigated and the proposed secure AODV mechanism can be studied for this scenario.
• Encryption algorithms other than AES and SPECK64 could be explored, and their efficacy and performance could be investigated for the proposed secure AODV protocol.
• The use of hash-based message authentication codes, such as HMAC, could be investigated as a replacement for the currently used symmetric key encryption algorithms in the proposed mechanism. While using HMAC would have the added benefit of authenticating the integrity of transmitted packets, it would result in longer packets due to the hash output included in packets, e.g., if HMAC is used with SHA-256 , the hash output will be 256 bits in length, which is significantly larger than the 64 -bit signature used in the proposed mechanism. The use of different message authentication codes and hash functions could be explored and their efficacy and performance could be investigated.
• The energy efficiency of the proposed secure AODV mechanism could be investigated.
